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On the Theopolitics of Sovereignty: Carl Schmitt and the 
theopolitics of global orders
Abstract
This article considers how we can develop a reflexive reading of the theological contours of 
global politics through Carl Schmitt’s account of sovereignty. In doing this it seeks to generate 
a critical architecture to understand the pluralistic registers of sovereignty within world 
politics. This article examines the theological dimensions of sovereignty, calling for a closer 
reading of the theopolitical discourses of legality and legitimacy at work within the largely 
secular discipline of International Relations. Tracing the pluralistic dimensions of 
sovereignty—juristic, popular and theopolitical—allows us to see how sovereignty is 
operationalised through a range of distinct political registers. When the study of sovereignty 
is confused with questions of preference for modes of governing (whether secular, religious, 
democratic, and/or juristic) the complex historical sociology of sovereignty is overlooked. 
Contemporary scholarship in International Relations can benefit from closer engagement with 
the multiple, overlapping registers of sovereignty in global politics. We may disagree with 
Schmitt’s reading of sovereignty as ‘theopolitics’ but there is real methodological value in 
engaging secular scholarship in thinking about religion as a constitutive domain for global 
order—alongside a rich range of critical approaches.
Theological Space in International Relations
The historical record is replete with accounts of political actors invoking God (or ‘the gods’) 
as part of territorial claims by state-based actors. Strategic invocations of god and the sacred 
are not necessarily a relic of the past, although the discipline of International Relations has 
reached out to Thucydides in addressing the role of ‘the gods’ in reflecting on fates and 
fortunes within international politics. As the Melians plea for their survival, we are reminded 
by the Athenians that invoking ‘the gods’ (or indeed standing up for what is right against what 
is wrong) is itself against the dictates of political morality: “Our opinion of the gods and our 
knowledge of men lead us to conclude that it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule 
wherever one can” (Brown, et al., 2002, p. 57). Overwhelmingly the disciplinary logic(s) of 
international relations are secular, reflecting a Western preoccupation with progressive 
narratives of the Enlightenment and the quest to demonstrate how technostrategic thinking 
represents a progressive turn in global politics. The concept of secular political authority 
requires closer investigation, especially as sovereignty itself is borne out of religious 
conceptions of authority and how they relate to territorial entities (Shakman Hurd, 2007). The 
question of religion is overwhelmingly pathologised by secular scholarship which assumes 
that international institutions (whether international law or international political institutions) 
operate through agreed principles of neutrality which stand above culture, identity and religion 
in global politics. This article seeks to demonstrate how authoritative claims within 
Westphalian accounts of International Relations, which are seemingly ‘secular’, involve a 
complex negotiation of the legitimacy and legality of decisionist capacity in world politics. 
Theological conceptions of authority do not simply disappear under the weight of positivist 
and secular orthodoxy within contemporary International Relations theory. For this reason, 
Carl Schmitt’s specific contribution is to demand that we read claims about the ‘englobement’ 
of international norms through the lens of suspicion, reflecting a distrust of universalizing 
norms within International Relations theory.
‘Englobement’ as simultaneously a concept, practice, and ethic of global order suggests the 
capacity to embrace shared norms and identities as part of the evolution of institutionalized 
International Relations (especially through the mechanisms of International Law). 
Englobement refers to the process of making meaning out of the world through the 
establishment of one global entity which, in itself, possesses the authority to regulate the terms 
and conditions of global politics. For Schmitt, no such normative device exists as the grounds 
of sovereignty are determined through spatialized political orders which have no claim to 
speak on behalf of a unified world or globe (Schmitt, 1987). It is these political orders which 
determine the shape and scope of international law, entailing the refusal of a universalizing 
order which speaks in the name of global unity. As Luca Mavelli has carefully documented it 
is important to problematize the epistemological and ontological assumptions which construct 
“secularization as an essential component of security” (Mavelli, 2012, p. 179). Central to this 
account of international security is the linkage of territory, whether contested or established, 
to discourses of sovereignty in global politics. It is argued that the idea of a post-religious 
international order (where religion is understood as a site of conflict rather than the source of 
foundational concepts within International Relations) is linked to the myth of post-sovereignty 
in global politics. Sovereignty matters neither less nor more than previous eras or epochs. As 
a temporal and spatial claim, sovereignty must be understood through decisionist capacity; 
namely, who is authorized to speak and act on behalf of the territorially and spatially 
conditioned entity we commonly understand as ‘the state’?
Chowdury and Duvall have cautioned against the ‘post-sovereign’ (or ‘non-sovereign’) turn 
within international theory, especially as it relates to the ontology of the political subject in 
formulations of transgressive accounts of resistance in the horizon of political life itself. They 
conclude that “[i]t would be injudicious to ignore sovereignty, because not only does it come 
first, it does not go away” (Chowdhury & Duvall, 2014, p. 219). This article seeks to identify 
three overlapping registers of sovereignty—juristic, popular, and theopolitical—which 
despite their problematic placement within territorial accounts of international politics are 
recognisable dispositifs of contemporary security politics, notably exceptionalism and how it 
conditions discourses of sovereignty in global politics of the past, present and ultimately the 
future. It is argued that the theological is the most hidden dimension of sovereignty and that 
even seemingly secular concepts in International Relations are textured in complex ways 
through the theological. Most relevant to the current discussion, it is argued that theology plays 
a decisive role in providing a justification for exceptionalism within contemporary security 
politics. 
Drawing upon Carl Schmitt’s account of political theology, it is possible to understand how 
both the norms and dynamics of political order—especially at the level of ontology and 
epistemology—are enabled through inadvertent expressions of faith, spirituality and the 
religious within key concepts within International Relations. Giving careful consideration to 
the ways in which the secularised vocabularies of global order are emergent from within a 
theological frame allows us to think differently about core concepts and practices within IR. 
For example, examining how security exceptionalism (where military security is taken as the 
primary object of security) is enabled through a theological domain is of methodological value 
when religion, faith and, the politics of religious fundamentalism are routinely expressed 
through discourses of ‘danger’ in global politics. This article argues that we need to play close 
attention to the relationship between the temporal (the seen) and the spiritual (the unseen) 
which conditions our understanding of sovereign decision-making. Paying attention to the 
popular, juristic and theological domains of sovereignty in equal measure potentially allows 
for a rebalancing of sovereignty beyond its populist domain in contemporary global politics. 
More crucially, it is important to challenge the predominance of the secularist ethic in 
International Relations which associates secularism with a progressive narrative of global 
order. Presenting a critical archeology of sovereignty involves the refusal of ‘religion as 
variable’ approach to global politics, revealing how theology functions at the ontological and 
epistemological level—often without states, people and International Relations theorists 
actually knowing it. 
Mika Louma-Aho has noted, in examining the turn to religiosity in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks and the ensuing War on Terror, that the European body politic has been a site of 
contestation between Western Christianity and Empire (Louma-Aho, 2009). The biblical 
origins of political community are part of the dynamic relationship between Empire and 
Christianity in the European context, although clearly its reach extended well beyond Europe 
through subsequent histories of colonialism and the cultural dispossession of indigenous 
peoples. Developing an understanding of the disciplinary tendency to generate mythologies of 
the person through the state (Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan is the most prominent example) it is 
noted that IR theorists themselves are engaged in the production of a certain type of religion or 
theology around ‘the international’. In terms of specific manifestations of global insecurity, the 
interactionist model of global politics—where national interests jockey for power within a 
territorialized realm—involves the disciplinary production of a specific narrative which can be 
understood as a theological order. As Mika Louma-Aho notes in relation to the ‘theology of 
IR’: “Our gods do not leave their punishments and rewards to afterlife: the states we live and 
believe in can release hell on earth, and have done so, over and over, the world over” (Louma-
Aho, 2009, p. 308).
It is important to understand how discourses of salvation, whether religious or secular, occupy 
a strategic role in the legitimation of the state as the organizing principle and decisive political 
entity in International Relations. In documenting the manifestations of violence in global 
politics, William T Cavanaugh has refuted the notion that religion necessarily produces 
violence. On the contrary, Cavanaugh’s focus on soteriology (concerning the doctrine of 
salvation and how these narratives condition certain types of political rationalities around the 
functioning of the state) highlights how the state has itself used salvation as a vehicle for 
conquest, war and enslavement of indigenous peoples and communities: “The myth of the wars 
of religion is also a soteriology, a story of our salvation from mortal peril” (Cavanaugh, 2009, 
p. 123). What Cavanaugh refers to as the soteriology of the state illustrates how doctrines of 
authority, whether secular or religious, are enabled through salvation. Nonetheless, religious 
doctrines of salvation are increasingly replaced by secular variants of salvation since “the 
foundation of the state is based on the widely-accepted myth about the necessity of the state to 
save Europe from the ‘Wars of Religion’ in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries’ 
(Cavanaugh, 2002, p. 9). Contractarian accounts of political community—Locke, Hobbes, 
Rousseau—can be read as the analogous narratives of the earlier theological traditions of 
Western Christianity. Stories of creation, fall and redemption are an inherent part of the 
theological imagination of world religions (especially Christianity and its many conflicted 
variants). Equally so, the modern state has used narratives of salvation as a means to produce 
political subjectivities which embody the consumer model of (in)security so attached to 
Westphalian security politics. The focus on salvation can also be related to the functionalist 
rendering of the state, whether in Max Weber’s classic formulation of the state as possessing 
‘monopoly on the legitimated use of physical force’ (Weber, 2004) or Charles Tilly’s less 
sanguine reading of the state as a ‘protection racket’ (Tilly, 1985).
What is new in this account of Schmitt’s political theology of sovereignty is that it positions 
itself at a critical distance from those who seek to revive Schmitt for the purpose of imagining 
a multipolar world constituted through agonistic (power) relations. The revival of Carl Schmitt, 
well documented in this journal and elsewhere, was inscribed with a particular purpose within 
radical democratic theory; namely, to understand how the friend-enemy dialectic can enable 
new forms of engagement with the Other in contemporary political thought (Mouffe, 1999). 
The approach taken in this article is to deploys Schmitt’s taxonomy on sovereignty and theology 
to make sense of our own anxieties and dilemmas concerning the status of religion and theology 
in International Relations theory today. In this regard, the article does not accept the teleological 
claims of Schmitt’s conception of political community but, in keeping with a need to understand 
the hierarchical ordering of concepts within International Relations, seeks to unpack how 
sovereignty operates through categories which exceed secular logics. It should be noted that the 
resurgence in sovereignty within global politics – whether at the borders of Calais, the symbolic 
walls of Trump, or demands for a ‘blue, red, and white Brexit’ – demonstrate the need for 
greater reflexive engagement with the terms, conditions, and limits of sovereignty. 
This article is structured to reflect an engagement with Carl Schmitt’s theological writings, 
linking these to a broader understanding of geopolitics and religion within contemporary 
International Relations. The first section examines how sovereignty has become fashioned 
through secularism and why we need to deploy a pluralistic methodology for understanding 
global order. In calling for an appreciation of the ‘theological space’ within IR it is important 
to rethink religion as a ‘variable’ within global politics. The next section examines why we need 
to focus on how sovereignty is enabled through a range of ‘sovereign’ discourses—juristic, 
popular, and theopolitical—in order to avoid the methodological trap of treating ‘secular’ 
sovereignty as the only valid and legitimate sovereignty within global politics. The discussion 
concludes by calling for an appreciation of the codes (or understandings) of theological space 
within and outside International Relations. The liberal rendering of a ‘rules-based order’ fails 
to appreciate the critical role of theology in both theories and practices of world politics 
(something which the late Nick Rengger dedicated a significant body of his work towards 
addressing). 
Sovereignty and the Secular
The selection of ‘sovereignty’ as a vehicle to understand how the theological informs the 
seemingly secular within International Relations reflects the fact that sovereignty is nearly 
always taken as a given within global politics. Declarations of sovereignty are imbued with a 
semi-religious significance in the political world. From the Brexit catch cry of “Take Back 
Control” or invocations to “Make America Great Again” it is important to think critically about 
the liminal spaces of sovereignty in global politics. For those political communities who lack 
the formal dimensions of sovereignty, in the sense of Walzer’s legalist paradigm where 
territorial integrity and political sovereignty are regarded as the primary aspirations of 
political actors, it is important to think about how the seemingly secular practices of statecraft 
are products of religious movements, Empire and dispossession in global order (Walzer, 
2015). What we should take from Schmitt’s reading of sovereignty is the importance of 
originary mythologies in constituting the modern state form today. 
“Sovereign is he who decides on the exception” Schmitt declares in the opening paragraph of 
Political Theology (Schmitt, 1985, p. 5). Formulating the concept of the political in terms of 
the exception involves a theologically driven account of politics than that contained in the 
friend-and-enemy grouping. For this reason, it is important to consider how theology 
establishes Schmitt’s exceptional concept of the international and, in so doing, undercuts the 
very ambition of a concept of the political derived autonomously (Moore, 2010). Theology 
gives Schmitt’s concept of the political its decisiveness, allowing it to bring order to the 
inherent anarchy associated with the exception. Related to Schmitt’s theological rendering of 
the political, identified here as Theopolitik, is a claim about the need for a decisionist ethic in 
both legal and international theory. This decisionist ethic is not just confined to defining the 
amity lines of political community but also, more broadly, concerned with the conditions under 
which order itself is attained. Schmitt thinks that the liberal model lacks this decisionist 
capacity since it operates in terms of impersonal rules rather than acting decisively in terms of 
decision.
Schmitt’s account of sovereignty works in terms of the exception. Sovereignty is defined as 
he who decides on the exception. Schmitt thereby links sovereignty to the borderline case. 
“The definition of sovereignty,” Schmitt notes, “must therefore be associated with a borderline 
case and not with routine” (Schmitt, 1985, p. 5). Schmitt contests the value of the liberal 
jurisprudential model, especially its tendency to look to the norm as a means of determining 
conduct in the emergency. Exceptions to the rule are more powerful determinants of political 
right and conduct than the rule itself: “The exception, which is not codified in the existing 
legal order, can at best be characterised as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of 
the state, or the like. But it cannot be circumscribed factually and made to conform to a 
preformed law” (Schmitt, 1985, p. 6). Sovereignty thus refers to a higher power, not a derived 
power in which subjects authorise another to act on their behalf. Sovereignty cannot be 
reduced to popular decision, resolved democratically through participatory forms. Sovereignty 
consists in the “concrete application” of the decision. The sovereign is thus defined as he “who 
decides in a situation of conflict what constitutes the public interest or interest of the state, 
public safety and order, le salut public, and so on” (Schmitt, 1985, p. 6).
The sovereign thus enjoys a formal, decisionist role that involves a concept of the political that 
is not just confined to the concrete friend-and-enemy grouping. Sovereignty (and the 
sovereign) is without limits because the question about what constitutes the public interest or 
interest of state or public order and safety can never be foreclosed. It is the very concept of the 
exception that allows the sovereign to achieve his sovereignty. “It is precisely the exception,” 
Schmitt argues, “that makes relevant the subject of sovereignty, that is, the whole question of 
sovereignty. The precise details of an emergency cannot be anticipated, nor can one spell out 
what may take place in such a case, especially when it is truly a matter of extreme emergency 
and of how it is to be eliminated” (Schmitt, 1985, pp. 6-7).
For Schmitt, modern constitutionalism wants to eliminate the sovereign question from the 
political. A belief in the regulative capacity of law – Grotius, Kant, and Kelsen – means that 
law becomes the primary means by which a political community establishes public order and 
safety. Using the rule of law to determine the content of the political decision involves the 
disavowal of the sovereign and sovereignty. The exception cannot be removed from the world 
by juristic means. Schmitt’s exception is expressed in terms of a sublime, symbolising the 
highest region of both political conduct and knowledge. The exception stands outside a 
normally valid legal system. But it is not necessarily the case that this ontological condition 
(standing outside the norm) cannot contribute anything to the normative order more generally. 
It is the exception that defines the content of the norm, allowing the sovereign to decide when 
and whether “the constitution needs to be suspended in its entirety” (Schmitt, 1985, p. 7). For 
Schmitt, placing the emphasis on the sovereignty of law or the sovereignty of the people is 
inherently problematic. This is because sovereignty involves the final determination of an 
order. Looking to the people (popular sovereignty) or to the law (juristic sovereignty) is 
insufficient for the functional role that sovereignty plays in determining when normal law 
should be suspended under emergency law or “states of exception”.
It should be noted that this article seeks to understand the theopolitics behind sovereignty 
through the writings of Carl Schmitt. It does not, however, seek to maintain Schmitt’s priority 
of the theological over the the popular or the theological over the juristic. On the contrary, the 
intention is to underscore the multiple articulations of sovereignty within global politics and 
how these plural understandings are essential for making sense of the diverse textures of 
sovereign utterances within the practices, processes, and dominant ontologies of the 
contemporary state system. It is indisputable that both ‘law’ and ‘the people’ have become an 
important element of the conceptual vocabulary of sovereignty. It is argued that under the 
guise of secularism the dominant methodological frameworks within IR have failed to 
understand how many of the prejudgments within IR are encoded and enacted within 
theological space. Sovereignty (or more correctly, sovereignties) provide an important 
structure of address for making sense of the supposed limits between the normal and 
exceptional within global politics. 
In this regard, Schmitt admires Jean Bodin (1530-1596) for linking sovereignty to the practical 
concern of state stability. Sovereignty cannot be understood juristically but emerges as 
practical conduct and knowledge when a normal order is overpowered by the exception. The 
fact that Schmitt talks in terms of the exception (defined at various times as the borderline 
case, the critical case, the extreme case, and the dire emergency) means that the concept of 
‘sovereignty’ is located in a domain which exceeds the contemporary; that is to say, 
sovereignty does not depend upon pre-understandings that circulate widely within discourse 
but on conditions that miraculously present themselves as dilemmas that require the authority 
of the sovereign. Bodin is significant for Schmitt because although working within a natural 
law tradition Bodin allows for the suspension of universal law in the emergency. According 
to Bodin, Schmitt notes, “the prince is duty bound toward the estates or the people only to the 
extent of fulfilling his promise in the interest of the people; he is not so bound under conditions 
of urgent necessity” (Schmitt, 1985, p. 8).
According to Schmitt, the sovereign is not duty bound to obey law (juristic sovereignty) nor 
the will of the people (popular sovereignty) but called to be decisive when the stability of a 
dominant order is called into question. In view of this fact, Schmitt notes that sovereignty itself 
disappears when it must answer to another: “If in such cases the prince had to consult a senate 
or the people before he could act, he would have to be prepared to let his subjects dispense 
with him” (Schmitt, 1985, pp. 8-9). Sovereignty, as an expression of the decisionist capacity 
of the political, involves the immunity of the prince vis-à-vis the principality. The mark of 
sovereignty, Schmitt suggests, is the “authority to suspend valid law” (Schmitt, 1985, p. 9).
The Schmittian account of sovereignty does not think of sovereignty in terms of law (juristic 
sovereignty) or the power of the people (popular sovereignty). For Schmitt, there is a capacity 
problem at the heart of liberal thinking, whether liberal international law or liberal institutions, 
to adapt to the political challenges associated with decisionist politics. The liberal model 
attempts to make bellum omnium contra omnes (the highest expression of emergency politics) 
the routine business of constitutional politics. Yet the solutions offered by this approach to 
politics, whether national and/or international, fail to recognise the importance of suspending 
normal regimes when the political order is threatened by external or internal forces. Liberalism 
lacks the ability to address problems of global political (dis)order—whether war, dispute, 
and/or disagreement—because the means it has at its disposal is woefully inadequate for the 
concrete task of dealing face-to-face with enmity in world politics. This way of thinking about 
international politics, where problems of order can be resolved through popular will or through 
the rule of law, is problematic according to Schmitt. Law itself is not the product of norms; 
rather, what constitutes law is dependent on the decision. The claim being advanced by Schmitt 
is that norms are products of decisions: “Like every other order,” Schmitt announces, “the 
legal order rests on a decision and not on a norm” (Schmitt, 1985, p. 11).
Schmitt thereby links sovereignty to the question of competency and action when the state is 
confronted with the supreme emergency (where emergency situations are called into being by 
those with decisionist authority). Legal competency is defined as he [sic] “who is competent 
to act when the legal system fails to answer the question of competence.” Sovereignty involves 
answering the following question: “Who is responsible for that which has not been 
anticipated?” (Schmitt, 1985, p. 10). Schmitt’s account of sovereignty involves answering the 
question about who has competency when the legal system is in question. The juristic account 
of sovereignty (where sovereignty is expressed through legal agreement, codified through the 
rule of law) is unable to fulfil this role according to Schmitt. Juristic sovereignty stresses the 
equality of persons before the law; since all are equal before the law then individual claims 
about truth are always valid claims and inherently irreconcilable. In many respects, this 
popular dimension of truth rationalization can be read as a justification for expert knowledges 
(and possibly an oblique critique of post-truth politics). Popular sovereignty stresses the 
capacity of a people to collectively determine the field of political possibility and the upshot 
of deliberative agreement in the public sphere will determine the scope of action on the 
international stage. Nonetheless, since liberalism conceives of the people pluralistically 
Schmitt thinks it impossible for a people to generate an overarching framework to secure 
public order and safety. Sovereignty suffers when conceived in terms of either a juristic ethic 
or a popular ethic. This is reflected in Schmitt’s claim that a “jurisprudence concerned with 
ordinary day-to-day questions has practically no interest in the concept of sovereignty” 
(Schmitt, 1985, p. 12). 
The liberal register of sovereignty, where jurisprudence regulates disagreement through 
normal conceptions of law, is predicated on legality as established through routine. A norm-
based approach to law can be seen in liberal international law, where norm formation (and 
norm entrepreneurs) generate consensus about shared values or processes which govern the 
business of world politics. Whilst this liberal approach establishes a spatialized legal 
framework to understand certain types of conduct (and misconduct) in global politics it does 
not necessarily reveal the production and reproduction of values beyond the routine. For 
Schmitt, the exception produces a higher form of legality than that associated with legality 
produced through juristic sovereignty and/or popular sovereignty. Schmitt claims that “[t]he 
exception is that which cannot be subsumed; it defies general codification, but it 
simultaneously reveals a specifically juristic element—the decision in absolute purity” 
(Schmitt, 1985, p. 13). This dual ontology means that law, construed as codified legality, is 
associated with a lower type of legality: “Every general norm demands a normal, everyday 
frame of life to which it can be factually applied and which is subjected to its regulations. The 
norm requires a homogenous medium” (Schmitt, 1985, p. 13). The exception cannot be framed 
in relation to everyday life and, because it does not manifest itself through a normal regime, 
lacks an immediate ontology. The use of a normal regime to combat chaos is thus specifically 
rejected by Schmitt: “There exists no norm that is applicable to chaos. For a legal order to 
make sense, a normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign who definitely decides whether 
this normal situation actually exists” (Schmitt, 1985, p. 13). 
Schmitt’s exceptional account of sovereignty stands in direct opposition to Lockean and 
Kantian conceptions of the constitutional state. Attempting to regulate the exception places 
too much faith in the capacity of rationalism to moderate political knowledge and conduct. 
Regulation of the exception can also be understood, in Schmittian terms, as the betrayal of the 
very notion of sovereignty. Thus, “[e]mergency law was no law at all for Kant. The 
contemporary theory of the state reveals the interesting spectacle of the two tendencies facing 
one another, the rationalist tendency, which ignores the emergency, and the natural law 
tendency, which is interested in the emergency and emanates from an essentially different set 
of ideas” (Schmitt, 1985, p. 14). Schmitt associates rationalism with an inability to come to 
terms with the exception, manifested in the claim that “the exception proves nothing and that 
only the normal can be the object of scientific interest”. This is given its clearest articulation 
by Schmitt when he claims that in order to study the general you need to be alert to the extreme 
boundaries of the exception:
It [the exception] reveals more clearly than does the general. Endless talk 
about the general becomes boring: there are exceptions. If they cannot be 
explained, then the general cannot be explained. The difficult is usually not 
noticed because the general is not thought about with passion but with a 
comfortable superficiality. The exception, on the other hand, thinks the 
general with intense passion (Schmitt, 1985, p. 15).
Schmitt’s exceptional notion of political sovereignty affirms the importance of philosophy 
which takes a concrete form: “Precisely a philosophy of concrete life must not withdraw from 
the exception and the extreme case, but must be interested in it to the highest degree” (Schmitt, 
1985, p. 15). Schmitt links the development of a ‘philosophy of concrete life’ to the need for 
the sovereign to determine the conditions by which a normal legal regime can be suspended. 
The exception involves a concrete relationship to the world because of the fact that it 
challenges the normative precepts that regulate the liberal jurisprudential model of global 
politics. Schmitt works from the presupposition that the exception is more interesting than the 
rule and, in so doing, associates the exception with a higher form of legality than that advanced 
through systematic approaches to international law and politics. The fact that the exception 
gives deeper insights into legality than the rule affirms the dual ontology of legality advanced 
by Schmitt. This leads Schmitt to claim that “[t]he rule proves nothing; the exception proves 
everything: It confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which derives from the 
exception” (Schmitt, 1985, p. 15).
The Schmittian vision of sovereignty is in stark opposition to the normative recoding of 
sovereignty in liberal jurisprudence. Hans Kelsen seeks to demonstrate why thinking of 
sovereignty in terms of supreme power or supreme order represents a partial view of 
sovereignty. “To be sovereign,” Kelsen declares, “seems to be incompatible with being subject 
to a normative order; thus to maintain the idea of the state as a supreme authority this term is 
understood to mean only a supreme legal authority, so that ‘sovereignty’ of the state means 
only that the state is not subject to its own legal order” (Kelsen, 1969, p. 115). Kelsen is 
concerned that this type of thinking, as is contained in Schmitt’s exceptional notion of 
sovereignty, results in sovereignty being denied its normative status. The Schmittian account 
of sovereignty thinks of the sovereign as a “kind of superman or superhuman organism” 
(Kelsen, 1969, p. 115). Kelsen takes issue with this extreme hypostatization of sovereignty. 
This is because Kelsen understands law as the artefact of human will not, contrary to Schmitt, 
the product of an exceptional lawmaker who determines when law itself can be suspended. 
This is reflected in Kelsen’s understanding of law, especially at the international level. “What 
we call society or community,” Kelsen declares, “is either the factual coexistence of 
individuals or a normative order of their mutual behaviour” (Kelsen, 1969, p. 115).  This can 
be contrasted with the Schmittian concept of sovereignty which, owing to its exceptional 
nature, dismisses the capacity of normative order to generate political community. Schmitt 
works from the premise that normative order is always conditional on a higher form of legality, 
emerging only through the exception: “In the exception the power of real life breaks through 
the crust of a mechanism that has become torpid by repetition” (Schmitt, 1985).
Schmitt claims that Kelsen’s normative science places too much emphasis on the normative 
and, for this reason, it is unable to derive legality from the concrete experience of the 
exception. According to Schmitt, “Kelsen solved the problem of sovereignty by negating it” 
(Schmitt, 1985, p. 21). Schmitt associates this negation of sovereignty with Kelsen’s desire to 
turn sovereignty into a normative rather than an exceptional order. Asking that sovereignty be 
assessed in terms of how an authoritative order is established through real human wills 
challenges the Schmittian notion of sovereignty which depends on the existence of an 
exceptional will. The purity of law, as bound up in Schmitt’s notion of legality as the chance 
to compel obedience, involves the sovereign being in a position to determine when normal 
conditions of legality can be suspended. Thus, Schmitt’s exceptional account of sovereignty 
is incompatible with Lockean conceptions of law. Locke distinguishes law from commission; 
the former expresses legality through a process of contract and authorisation, the latter 
understands legality as derived from divine monarchical right. Both Locke and Kelsen, as 
defenders of the liberal model, reduce legal prescription down to how decisions are to be made; 
to the detriment of who should decide:
But he [Locke] did not recognize that the law does not designate to whom it 
gives authority. It cannot be just anybody who can execute and realize every 
desired legal prescription. The legal prescription, as the norm of decision, only 
designates how decisions be made, not who should decide. In the absence of 
a pivotal authority, anybody can refer to the correctness of the content. But 
the pivotal authority is not derived from the norm of decision. Accordingly, 
the question is that of competence, a question that cannot be raised by and 
much less answered from the content of the legal quality of a maxim (Schmitt, 
1985, pp. 32-33).
Who or what has competency has significant implications for the practice and discipline of 
International Relations. With authority understood as driving legitimacy (rather discourses of 
truth or what is right) the image of legal personality established by Schmitt is unapologetically 
elitist in its origins as well as its consequences. At its core is the theopolitics of the sovereign 
which stresses the importance of keeping the most extreme articulation of sovereignty beyond 
the reach of normal regimes of law and/or away from ‘the people’ (who can’t be trusted!). It 
should be noted that Schmitt’s hierarchical ordering of sovereignty fails to appreciate the 
overlapping registers of sovereignty which he himself understood as aspects of sovereignty, 
albeit with differing degrees of political efficacy. Schmitt’s theopolitical approach—even in 
spite of its privileging of theology above the rule of law and ‘the people’—highlights the 
importance of scholarship in IR which contests the modalities and mythologies of sovereignty 
carefully. We do not have to agree with Schmitt about the hierarchical ordering of sovereignty 
with theology at its apex, but there is value in examining how secular orders have generated 
their own mythologies about legality, legitimacy and political agency within global politics.  
Having considered how ‘to read’ hierarchies of sovereignty the next section considers why 
religion and theology must be understood as constitutive of world order (not just as variables 
in global politics). 
Rethinking Religion as a ‘variable’ within IR
Religion has too often been regarded as a ‘variable’ within international politics without due 
acknowledgement of the systematic theological logics at work within the ‘mechanics’ of 
global politics itself. In a survey of the placement of religion within International Relations, 
Sandal and James (2011) focused on the role of religion vis-à-vis mainstream theories of 
international politics. Their focus on how religion should be understood through the 
frameworks of classical realism, structural realism and neoliberalism reflects this ‘variable’ 
based approach to religion and theology in contemporary International Relations. Most 
remarkably, treating religion as an identity-claim (alongside race, ethnicity and gender) means 
that identity is not understood as a constitutive dimension of power, governance, and 
sovereignty in world politics. Linked to this ‘variable’ based approach (where religion is 
conceptualised as a phenomena of international relations) is the failure to grasp the co-
constitutive nature of religion and norms within International Relations more broadly. 
Focusing on the question of sovereignty, its religious origins, is the primary focus of this 
article. The objective is to encourage deeper reflection on the epistemological and ontological 
dimensions of theology within the discipline of International Relations. By moving beyond 
the conscious (or observable) deployment of religious practices or theology within the space 
of global politics it is possible to see the extent to which conceptions of faith, religion and 
theology are reflected in foundational concepts and practices within global politics itself. 
According to Sandal and James (2011, p. 6), “religious phenomena should be investigated as 
an independent (as a cause), intervening (as a link between the cause and the resulting 
observation) and dependent variable (as the ‘product’ of non-religious causes)”. This article 
still acknowledges the need for IR scholars to investigate the deep causal, relational and/or 
interdependent interactions which are carried out in the name of religion, religious traditions 
and theologies. It does, however, in focussing on Carl Schmitt’s theological syntax of 
sovereignty suggest the need for a critical awareness of how practices which are seemingly 
secular received their original meaning through theological worlds. Schmitt’s concept of 
sovereignty stresses the need for the state to determine, with concrete clarity, the conditions 
by which a normal legal order can be suspended for the sake of securing a higher level of 
public order and safety. The question of who is compelled to decide is accorded greater 
significance than how decisions are to be made. Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty remains 
loyal to the notion of the sovereign; sovereignty cannot be shared democratically (popular 
sovereignty) nor reconfigured normatively through the rule of law (juristic sovereignty). 
Sovereignty involves the identification of legal competency when a normative order has been 
suspended and/or ceases to provide an authoritative structure for decision-making. The liberal 
jurisprudential model, Schmitt argues, is useless when confronted with a constitutional 
emergency; its desire to establish a legal order through normative maxims involves the very 
negation of the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot be recodified through normative 
prescription and, for this reason, the liberal model cannot sufficiently respond to the concrete 
urgency of the decision. Schmitt is adamant that sovereignty is a practical rather than an 
abstract discourse involving real questions about who is competent to act rather than normative 
considerations of political and/or legal right. A fundamental limitation of Schmitt’s assessment 
of sovereignty is that the definition of sovereign competency is determined largely by this 
theological vision of the world. Sovereignty cannot be understood autonomously—in terms of 
its specific tensions—but only makes sense when phrased in theological terms. Sovereignty 
can be understood as a form of international (political) theology for the sole reason that:
All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized 
theological concepts not only because their historical development—in which 
they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for 
example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver—but also 
because of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for 
a sociological consideration of the concepts. The exception in jurisprudence 
is analogous to the miracle in theology. Only by being aware of this analogy 
can we appreciate the manner in which the philosophical ideas of the state 
developed in the last centuries (Schmitt, 1985, p. 36).
Documenting the origins of the state, through the emergence of philosophical ideas of the state, 
has played a key role in the legitimation of International Relations as a discipline. Carl 
Schmitt’s concern with the theopolitical workings of sovereignty establishes a systematic 
relationship between international jurisprudence and theology. Mika Luoma-Aho has called 
for a fundamental reframing of International Relations in challenging the secular narrative of 
global politics. Not only does this fundamentally challenge the variable-based approach to 
religion, as something which is done to people or something which people do, it also calls for 
a critical reading of the dogmatism of scholarship within International Relations. International 
relations functions as a religion and the state is its god: “What this makes IR-the-discipline is 
a theology of sorts, hiding under the canopy of secular social science” (Luoma-Aho, 2012, p. 
xiv).
A similar story can be gleaned from the theoretical frameworks developed by scholars of 
International Relations, for whom secular reasoning expresses the logic of international 
institutions and political processes at the international level. If religion is to be invoked, then 
this is primarily as an explanatory model for understanding conflict or for making sense of the 
evolution of the modern state system as a progressivist narrative. Fukuyama has claimed that 
“the secular ideas of the Enlightenment eroded belief in religion as such” (Fukuyama, 2011, 
p. 289). Such texts are littered with progressivist claims, largely functioning to reinforce the 
power relations of colonialism, that secularism is a political ethic which belongs to modernity 
and expresses true human progress. For this reason, there is value in thinking about whether 
religion disappears under the weight of secularism (and secularization) or whether religious 
orders continue to exert their influence on political communities irrespective of whether they 
are intentionally religious or not. The concept of sovereignty is one such litmus test, allowing 
us to consider the extent to which sovereignty is produced (and reproduced) as a human 
endeavor through norms (Kelsen) or whether sovereignty is an emergent concept that makes 
itself concretely known only when the state is faced with threats to its security (Schmitt).
For Hans Morgenthau, the question of establishing international jurisprudence (through the 
rule of law at the international level) or universal claims to morality (through shared 
understandings of international morality) will always be subject the dictates of the national 
interest. Kelsen’s ambition to establish norms which regulate the interactions between state 
and non-state actors will necessarily fail at the juncture where national ethics professes to 
speak as international ethics. As Morgenthau observes, “[t]he moral code of one nation flings 
the challenge of its universal claim into the face of another, which reciprocates in kind”. 
(Morgenthau, 1960, p. 256). Kelsen’s patterning of sovereignty stresses the way in which 
norms are the product of intersubjective agreement concerning the validity of a given order. 
Kelsen assesses the validity of norms in the following terms: “Norms are valid for those whose 
conduct they regulate.” This leads Kelsen to claim that jurisprudence “sees the law as a system 
of general and individual norms” and, for this reason, he claims that “facts are considered in 
this jurisprudence only to the extent that they form the content of legal norms.” Schmitt rejects 
Kelsen’s normative reconfiguration of legality on this basis that it rests upon a normative 
lawfulness rather than lawfulness established through the exception. According to Schmitt, 
Kelsen’s concept of legal order is “based on the rejection of all “arbitrariness,” and attempts 
to banish from the realm of the human mind every exception” (Schmitt, 1985, p. 41). 
It is important to separate questions of the origins or sources of different political registers of 
sovereignty from the consequential logics of sovereignty. If the origins of one version of 
sovereignty are deemed to be more legitimate according to the field of justification (e.g. 
popular sovereignty as a trump against theopolitical sovereignty) then this potentially 
overlooks the inherently political ontology of sovereignty itself. Whilst Suganami has also 
addressed the importance of coming to terms with both Schmitt and Kelsen for understanding 
the production of international law it is, nonetheless, important to resist the temptation to label 
one political register of sovereignty as necessarily more benign or more violent than each 
articulation. For example, Suganami notes that “Kelsen’s conception is relatively benign and 
points to the historically contingent (and therefore potentially evolving) content of 
international law, giving an impetus to a historical study of the evolution of legal norms” 
(Suganami, 2007, p. 530). Whilst such normative judgements can assist us in processing the 
different sorts of originary myths of sovereignty—from the “omnipotent lawgiver” to the 
“jurist” to “the people”—it is worthwhile noting that in constituting sovereignties as 
overlapping political registers the focus is on how sovereignties enable exceptional discourses 
of (in)security in global politics. Populist understandings of sovereignty can author violent 
ontologies as deeply violent and politically dehumanizing as theopolitical registers of 
sovereignty. Equally so, as Guantanamo Bay demonstrated there is sufficient space for juristic 
registers of sovereignty, constituted under liberal regimes of international law, to deliver real 
physical harm and epistemological violence as theopolitical registers of sovereignty. Perhaps 
it is the case the tendency to be more benign or more violent are themselves irrelevant when 
the boundaries between normal law and exceptional law are crossed. 
It should be noted that Schmitt’s account of sovereignty is normative to the core; that is, in 
establishing the exception as the definitive embodiment of sovereignty the teleological ends 
of sovereignty entail the violent subjugation of the people (popular sovereignty) and the rule 
of law (juristic sovereignty). Anne-Marie Slaughter has argued that “liberal international 
relations theory creates analytical space for both individuals and groups operating in domestic 
and transnational society and states, and conceptualizes them in relation to one another” 
(Slaughter, 1995, p. 742). For Schmitt, this conceptualization of an international spatial order 
would entail the rejection of the most decisive aspect of sovereignty (its capacity to generate 
a decision under the weight of the emergency situation).
In many respects, Schmitt’s reading of the theological register of sovereignty helps expose the 
myth of secular orders which permeates geopolitical thinking about identity and difference 
within global politics. The pathologizing of comparative religions, without referencing the 
theopolitical starting points of ‘Western’ traditions and modes of theological being, needs to 
be addressed as a fundamentally hostile act towards the Other within International Relations. 
Seyla Benhabib has resolutely claimed that “in addressing our politico-theological 
predicament Carl Schmitt is of little use” (Benhabib, 2010, p. 455). In considering the revival 
of religion in global politics, Benhabib has identified the ‘politics of veiling’ as a primary 
example of how political meanings are negotiated and renegotiated through time, space and 
culture: “The politics of the scarf has become a transnational struggle, revealing complex 
moves and counter-moves taking place among the sovereignty of the secular state, 
constitutional negotiations, and the symbolic markings of the female body” (Benhabib, 2010, 
p. 457). Yet Benhabib is confident that these struggles over meaning (and most worryingly, 
women’s bodies) are resolvable within the horizon of ‘overlapping [democratic] consensus’. 
The myth of secularism is firmly anchored in Benhabib’s call for democratic citizens to utilize 
‘democratic iterations’ (via Derrida) to address the changing frontiers of human rights in 
Western, democratic political culture. Nonetheless, Benhabib’s premature rejection of Carl 
Schmitt’s thinking on religion, political theology and discourses of exceptionalism illustrates 
how secularism has allowed itself to flourish as a self-fulfilling prophecy of global politics. It 
is for this reason, as the section below details, that we need to be open to the theological if we 
are to understand the constitution of global order more broadly. 
When IR Encounters Theological Space: Rethinking Theories and Practices
Reinhold Niebuhr spoke of a class of people who professed greater awareness of the limits of 
nationalism and national interest within political communities (as compared to those with ordinary, 
everyday lives): “There is always, in every nation, a body of citizens more intelligent than the 
average, who see the issues between their own and other nations more clearly than the ignorant 
patriot, and more disinterestedly than the dominant classes who seek special advantages in 
international relations” (Niebuhr, 2005, p. 57). We should clearly resist such elitism in assuming 
the seduction of the masses through populism, but there is value in dislocating the secular account 
of sovereignty in International Relations as the moment in which religion is cast aside in favour of 
secular international law (liberalism) and/or the business of technocratic statecraft (realism). In 
terms of critiquing liberal world order, this article seeks to demonstrate how religion should not be 
understood only as a variable to explain conflict in world politics (and, in so doing, turning religion 
into a pathology). On the contrary, religions and theologies establish a constitutive grounding for 
the terms of (global) political discourse and the secularisation of sovereignty has involved a 
forgetting of the ways in which power has been mobilised through both temporal and theological 
domains of sovereignty. 
Contemporary critics of liberalism in International Relations have rightly deployed Schmitt to 
document the collapse of Westphalian conceptions of global order. Louiza Odysseos and Fabio 
Petito rightly identify the dangers of reading Schmitt through one discipline. Schmitt’s work, 
they argue “… lies at the intersection of international relations, international law, and 
international history, while drawing at the same time on philosophy and political and legal 
theory intersections” (Odysseos & Petito, 2006, p. 2). Whilst their focus was on the contesting 
the hegemonic formulations of global order, specifically in terms of the Global War on Terror, 
there is a need to also extend the analysis to consider the ways in which these disciplines have 
themselves been colonised by secular assumptions about the constitution of world order. In 
other worlds, in overlooking religion and theology as an element of ways of thinking about 
states, sovereignty, and (global) orders in world politics there is a risk that we bifurcate the 
world into a progressivist narrative of the secular. Overlooking the theological and reinforcing 
the secular—regardless of one’s faith or indeed lack of faith—comes with attendant problems 
for scholars of International Relations. 
Although Schmitt’s account of political theology is primarily contained within two primary 
works—Political Theology: Four Chapters on Sovereignty and Political Theology II: The Myth 
of Political Closure—it is important to contextualise the significance of this ‘theopolitical’ 
mode within his broader account of spatialised international order and his determination to 
expose the normative limits of a consensus-based international legal order. We should be 
careful of accepting Schmitt at his ‘face-value’ and presuming that his conceptual rendering of 
the political in terms of the friend-and-enemy distinction maintains the distinctiveness of the 
political vis-à-vis other domains (e.g. religion, culture, economy, law, science) (Schmitt, 1996, 
p. 23). Whilst Schmitt explicitly isolates the political as distinct from a religious mode in his 
landmark text The Concept of the Political it is acknowledged that religion has the potential to 
be political only when it transforms itself through enmity. “Every religious, moral, economic, 
ethical, or other antithesis transforms itself into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group 
human beings effectively according to friend and enemy” (Schmitt, 1996, p. 37). Nonetheless, 
as Schmitt himself contends, notions of political will and political agency are dependent upon 
theologies of being which establish a moral flaw in the human condition. Schmitt’s Catholicism 
commits him to make sense of human agency in terms of ‘original sin’ and, in so doing, 
presupposes a fallen and failed vision of human conduct: “[a]ll genuine political theories 
presuppose man to be evil” (Schmitt, 1996, p. 61). 
The entrenched narrative of international order as an anarchical space (a prominent part of the 
so called ‘great debates’ within IR in the 1920s and 1930s) has largely overlooked the fact that 
its own theoretical house has been constructed out of the vestiges of political theology. 
Schmitt’s writings remind us of how ‘realist’ International Relations rests upon the 
“fundamental theological dogma of the evilness of the world” (Schmitt, 1996, p. 65). Political 
sovereignties—whether theological, juristic, and/or popular—are all expressions of 
worldviews about the nature of political agency and the scope of political institutions to regulate 
these through both procedural and normative fraemworks. These worldviews constitute the 
political theology of IR theory itself, unleashing specific grammars of power which contain 
within them codes and practices of the theopolitical past, present and future. These worldviews 
cannot be viewed in isolation from the historical role of both Church and State in establishing 
the geopolitical contours of modern political existence. We may profess to offer a scientific 
theory of international politics, informed by secular principles of ‘value neutrality’, but it is 
important to think about how the very foundations of International Relations are shaped by an 
array of (theological) landscapes. Schmitt directs us to think about the political in terms of the 
friend-and-enemy grouping, suggesting an inescapable ‘logic of the political’ (Schmitt, 1996, 
p. 79). Schmitt’s observations on political theology suggests that sovereignty itself is encoded 
in the normative practices of states at the international level. The purpose of underscoring this 
theological dimension is not to endorse a theological (or ‘theopolitical’ reading of global 
politics) but to remind observers of global politics of how the religious functions as a 
constitutive domain of sovereignty and statecraft. 
We may have moved beyond the bellum sacrum era where ‘holy wars’ provided one way of 
reading geopolitics, but as Schmitt argues in relation to World War 1, “[t]he experiences of the 
world war against Germany have shown that wartime propaganda in no way dispenses with the 
moral convictions that are normally only acquired from a Crusade” (Schmitt, 2011, p. 31). The 
very notion of war as a crusade (where war is understood as the art of crusading) may have 
disappeared under the weight of positivist international law but the establishment of legal 
universals (or norms of international law) indicates the inherent particularism of justice within 
the global sphere. Schmitt anticipated many debates about the selectivity of humanitarian 
intervention and the limits of universalism in global politics, especially in relation to minority 
rights and how these reflect the objectives of the dominant order rather than a universal order. 
The so-called ‘universal’ norms of international law should not be understood as “systematics 
of international law” but understood instead as examples of a “systematic conceptual 
geography” (Schmitt, 2011, p. 36). The geopolitical constellations of international law reveal 
how law operates as a discourse of power within global politics, with claims about justice (as 
well as legality, legitimacy, and sovereignty) being determined by the material conditions of 
land and sea within world history (Schmitt, 2015). 
Schmitt provides a two-pronged attack on the idealism of international lawyers on the one hand 
(who seek to demonstrate that international legal norms can regulate the conduct of states) and 
the global constitutionalism of diplomats on the other (who seek to demonstrate that 
international legal norms can bring people together through an ‘international community of 
peoples’) (Schmitt, 2011, p. 41). Quoting Goethe, Schmitt notes that when it comes to 
geopolitics that “[a]ll petty things have trickled away, Only sea and land count here” (Schmitt, 
2003, p. 37). What is key to Schmitt’s critique of liberal international is the decisive role of land 
(and sea) appropriation for making sense of the spatial ordering of global politics. What matters 
is ‘terrestrial being’ and how this establishes the “normative order of the earth” (Schmitt, 2003, 
p. 39). Schmitt draws upon the geopolitical legacy of Halford J Mackinder, who famously 
detailed the ‘pivotal’ placement of Europe within world history, in examining the conditions of 
terrestrial being within global politics and international law. The two primary concepts 
advanced within The Nomos of the Earth concern the dynamic interaction between Großraum 
and Nomos. As Elden contends, “the term [Großraum] intends to grasp an area or region that 
goes beyond a single state (that is, a specific territory), to comprehend much larger scale spatial 
orderings, complexes or arrangements” (Elden, 2010, p. 18). Schmitt’s account of history is 
decidedly linear, informed by all the privilege of the European legacy and the accompanying 
cultural capital of European historicising. With this linear approach to history, it is important to 
note how history moves from epoch to epoch and, in so doing, participates in what Hobson calls 
“the construction of an imaginary line of civilisational apartheid that fundamentally separated 
or split East from West” (Hobson, 2007, p. 94).
The postcolonial moment was largely absent from the revival of Carl Schmitt in the 1990s, with 
the emphasis on how Schmitt enables a critical architecture to contest the boundaries of liberal 
democracy and, in so doing, open up new potential for agonistic politics (Mouffe, 1999). Put 
simply, liberalism rejected the political and Schmitt’s thinking on the vitality of the political 
provides us with an opportunity to resist the inexorable rise of global capitalism which finds 
itself woven into the very fabric of liberal democracy. More recently, the focus has shifted to 
the need to make sense of the plural constructions of order at the international level by thinking 
of international legal order through Schmitt’s account of the ‘pluriverse’. Mouffe has argued 
“in favour of a multipolar world order which recognizes diversity and pluralism and does not 
envisage the world as a ‘universe’ but as a ‘pluriverse’” (Mouffe, 2009). The question as to how 
these diverse worlds are constructed, alongside the geopolitical contours of existing orders, 
raises important questions about the placement of religion and culture within this ‘global’ 
spatial order. Schmitt’s focus on land-appropriation as the vehicle of (geopolitical) world 
history acknowledges the importance of the spatial ordering of world politics through nomos. 
It is important to note that land-appropriation is a material process of history, rather than just a 
concept or way of thinking about the construction of international order (Schmitt, 2003, p. 82). 
As Schmitt notes, “[t]he many conquests, surrenders, occupations, annexations, cessions, and 
successions in world history either fit into an existing spatial order of international law, or 
exceed its framework and have a tendency, if they are passing acts of brute force, to constitute 
a new spatial order of international law” (Schmitt, 2003, p. 82). 
What is significant about Schmitt’s account of international law and, more crucially, why this 
is relevant to contemporary scholarship within International Relations is the material focus on 
the how the ‘contours of the earth emerged as a real globe’ (Schmitt, 2003, p. 86). Nonetheless, 
underneath this material approach is an acknowledgement that the shifting frontiers of 
geopolitical power have been shaped by non-material elements. We cannot look at Empire in 
isolation from religion, as it is evident that the shared meanings of global order have developed 
through different religion, faith, and civic traditions. As Phillips notes, “[i]nternational orders 
are composed first of a web of shared meanings that make the exercise of authoritative power 
possible between polities” (Phillips, 2011). Schmitt directs us to focus on the amity lines of 
global politics (that is, how friends can be differentiated from enemies in concrete political 
groupings). “From the 16th to the 20th century,” Schmitt notes, “European international law 
considered Christian nations to be the creators and representatives of an order applicable to the 
Earth” (Schmitt, 2003, p. 86). Schmitt argues that “[c]ivilization was synonymous with 
European civilization” and “Christian princes and peoples of Europe considered Rome or 
Jerusalem to be the centre of the earth” (Schmitt, 2003, pp. 86-87). What Schmitt refers to as 
‘global linear thinking’ brought about new ways of thinking about the division of the world into 
different political units. World maps do not just reflect the geographical contours of the earth, 
they provide a structure for making sense of shared meanings in different spaces and places. As 
Schmitt argues, the mapping of the earth carries with it “politically presupposed spatial 
concepts” which not only reflect the dominant power relations of the Judeo-Christian world, 
but also reveal the colonisation of ‘new worlds’ by ‘old worlds’ (Schmitt, 2003, p. 90). 
Schmitt talks about the ‘detheologization’ of European international during from the 16th to 19th 
century, largely due to an agreed settlement between Church and State in Western Europe after 
the reformation (Schmitt, 2003, p. 41). Nonetheless, international law may have been 
‘secularised’ but the territorial groupings of world politics reflect the divisions of the earth 
which were comprehensively and violently demarcated through Empire and colonialism. 
Schmitt’s Theory of the Partisan also provides us with a deeper reflection on the contours of 
enmity (and mythologies of the enemy) in global politics. Slomp argues that for Schmitt, 
“political theology inspires the basic beliefs that underpin the friend/enemy principle, namely 
the two-fold conviction that firstly we must try to limit hostility but must not try to overcome it 
and that secondly we must never let morality and politics mix” (Slomp, 2009). Whilst it is 
evident that Schmitt’s account of enmity in both The Concept of the Political and Theory of the 
Partisan helps to tap into the mythological dimensions of enmity, especially in relation to 
contemporary reflections on terrorism, it is important to link Schmitt’s account of political 
theology to his broader geopolitical worldview. Slomp notes that “[e]ven though Schmitt is 
probably more stimulating when he is polemical than when he toys with theology or with 
philosophy, his attempt to offer explanations, sometimes very elaborate, for holding his specific 
belief system is worthy of attention” (Slomp, 2009, p. 135). Slomp raises a serious question 
about whether Schmitt is, in fact, just playing around with theology at the margins or whether 
his concrete worldviews are informed by a political theology of the exception which conditions 
his reading of the landscape of international law and sovereignty in world politics. If the former, 
then Schmitt’s predilection for the transcendental can be understood as a quirk of an otherwise 
fascinating, albeit dangerous, geopolitical thinker. If the latter, then Schmitt’s political theology 
is inseparable from his more compelling work on the historical sociology of spatialised 
international legal order.  
Odysseos offers an insightful reading of the ‘dangerous ontologies’ at work not just in Schmitt’s 
political writings but also in the broader tradition of political realism within IR itself. Arguing 
that “Schmitt challenged the possibility of transcending the state of nature in international 
politics and, hence, called into question the very possibility that the liberal practice of law and 
the establishment of international institutions could promote peace and prevent war” Odysseos 
demands we pay closer attention to the way in which politics and ethics are enabled as 
‘partitioned’ concepts within IR theory (Odysseos, 2002, p. 412). Schmitt’s endorsement of the 
strict division between politics and ethics is a prominent feature of his account of international 
legal order and the requirement that sovereignty exercises not through a normative lens but 
through the exercise of power itself. With this in mind, a more detailed reading of Schmitt’s 
account of political theology, as presented in the current article, can direct us to think about 
sovereignty in different ways. In engaging with Schmitt’s theopolitical framework of 
international legal order, one which observes the continuities between Church and State rather 
than its complete separation, we do not need to accept that sovereignty is a religious principle 
within global politics. We do, however, discover how discourses of sovereignty have emerged 
from dominant world groupings and how these same spatial orders contain within them 
assumptions about both the emergence of power and legitimacy in world politics. Schmitt’s 
account of geopolitics directs us to focus on the changing contours of world history and how 
these are continually reconfigured through war, conflict and violence in world politics. 
In Constitutional Theory, Schmitt defines international law as “the sum of customary or 
conventionally recognized rules for these relations of mere coexistence” (Schmitt, 2008, p. 
381). This text provides the direct link between Schmitt’s account of ‘the political’ (where the 
friend and enemy grouping provides the basis for politics) and his account of the spatial ordering 
of sovereignty in world politics. Sovereignty is directly linked to the process of differentiating 
friend from enemy: “The question of sovereignty, however, is the decision on an existential 
conflict” (Schmitt, 2008, p. 389). This ‘existential conflict’ is at the heart of sovereignty, as 
Schmitt argues, “the enemy is something existentially other and foreign, the most extreme 
escalation of the otherness, which in the case of conflict leads to the denial of its own type of 
political existence” (Schmitt, 2008, p. 394). For Schmitt, political existence is nullified by the 
foreign: “the will to self-determination, which belongs to anything that exists politically, is 
nullified or endangered only through interference that is foreign in existential terms” (Schmitt, 
2008, p. 394). We may not like Schmitt’s foray into theology or philosophy, we may think it 
peripheral to his broader spatial-political project, but the emphasis placed on the extremes of 
political existence requires a closer reading: Who is authorised to make political decisions and 
at what level? What type of framework of legitimation has developed to make sense of the 
workings of modern sovereignty and how are these linked to questions of legal capacity? Where 
are the limits of the different (and shared) accounts of sovereignty within the international 
system? The next section seeks to unpack the three dimensions of sovereignty—theopolitical, 
juristic, and popular—and how these are linked to theopolitical utterances. 
Outing theology within international order
The value of Schmitt’s account of sovereignty (as a concept which is almost always tested at 
its limits) is to reveal the religious workings of secular concepts within both the theory and 
practice of International Relations. Benhabib is dismissive of the ‘unthought’ dimension of 
theology and religion within political communities, practices of statecraft and within the 
spatialized logics of global politics (Benhabib, 2010, p. 454). Along with Habermas and 
Rawls, Benhabib treats religion as an identity constituted through differences within 
multicultural society. There are clear limits to this way of thinking about religion and theology 
in global politics: firstly, the resolution to the problem of religious difference are encased in 
both ethnocentrism and Eurocentrism; secondly, the values of religion must be accommodated, 
accounted for and negotiated within the realm of consensus based reason; thirdly, the method 
of resolution failures to direct those who are the most ardent critics of specific religious 
practices or religions to reflexively examine their own ‘secular’ and/or ‘religious’ ontologies. 
For this reason, agreeing with Nicholas Rengger, “we have no understanding of how centrally 
the theological is still embedded in the modern and thus fail to understand the modern itself” 
(Rengger, 2013, p. 143).
For Rengger “taking the theological voice seriously offers a rich repository of ideas and 
avenues of investigation that International Relations would be foolish to ignore” (Rengger, 
2013, p. 153). An example of how we can take the theological voice seriously (without 
mandating scholarship within global politics to embrace religion) is to carefully read the 
historical sociology of sovereignty through a range of complex, contradictory political 
registers. The liberal abandonment of the exception is the secularization of sovereignty 
through the machinery of the modern state. Carl Schmitt is concerned that the modern theory 
of the state involves the rationalization of authority, endangering the very concept of 
sovereignty (that is, who is enabled to make decisions) by attempting to justify the authority 
of the state through rational or semi-rational means. According to Schmitt, “viewed from the 
history of ideas, the development of the nineteenth-century theory of the state displays two 
characteristic moments: the elimination of all theistic and transcendental conceptions and the 
formation of a new concept of legitimacy” (Schmitt, 1985, p. 51). For Schmitt, attempting to 
give sovereignty a foundation in the everyday, expressed in the concept of popular 
sovereignty, is inherently problematic for Schmitt. Likewise, the routine placement of 
sovereignty through the rule of law (whether at the domestic or international level) fails to 
appreciate the godlike practices of sovereignty in global politics. That is to say, the constitutive 
foundations of sovereignty cannot be expressed popularly; sovereignty is the divine expression 
of the metaphysical realm, emerging concretely through the exception. The dilemmas of this 
theopolitical account of sovereignty should be duly noted, especially as it fails to enact limits 
on the exercise of political power. Yet the limits of both popular sovereignty and juristic 
sovereignty should also be thinly understood, as the capacity to exercise brute expressions of 
power is not necessarily overcome within both democratic theory and/or liberal international 
law. 
Stuart Elden has warned “that anointing of Schmitt as a geopolitical theorist with contemporary 
relevance is … a serious error, intellectually and politically” (Elden, 2010, p. 24). The basis for this 
claim concerns the importance of looking at Schmitt’s geopolitical writings against the backdrop 
of his broader writings. This article, it should be noted, does not seek to anoint Schmitt as the grand 
theorist of sovereignty. On the contrary, in demanding a closer reading of sovereignty as it relates 
to the secular and non-secular domain the emphasis is on asking for greater awareness of how 
meanings about power, state, and territory resonate through established practices in global politics. 
Religion is not a variable within the broader domain of International Relations, but a constitutive 
domain of global order(s) itself. It may appear in different places and spaces in varying degrees, 
but the drive towards secularism as the sine qua non of progressivism in global politics needs to be 
decisively contested. 
We know in Schmitt’s account of political theology that the ‘miracle need not be true’ and in this 
regard we should pay attention to George Sorel’s understanding of the power of myth in reflecting 
on human conduct within International Relations. Sorel noted that “myths must be judged as a 
means of acting on the present” (Sorel, 1999, p. 116). In demanding that we think about sovereignty 
as constituted through multiple domains this article is advocating for an understanding of 
sovereignty which is alert to mythologies of theology as equally as the mythologies as secularism. 
There exists a rich body of international political theory which explicitly draws upon a liberal canon 
as a basis for determining the rules, norms, and scope of International Relations. This article, in 
drawing upon Schmitt’s theopolitical account of sovereignty, seeks to unpack the ways in which 
registers of sovereignty should not be fashioned exclusively in the image of liberalism and/or 
secularism. Whether we draw upon the writings of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and/or Immanuel 
Kant to understand the liberal dimensions of global order we need to also understand how 
alternative readings of global order are possible and likely from a range of theoretical perspectives. 
We have become adept at reading global politics through the lens of orthodoxy and flattening our 
horizons of international order to a limited set of ideological domains: realist, liberal, critical, post-
positivist, and so it goes. Understanding how the seemingly secular exists alongside the religious, 
the theological, and the spiritual is not to endorse theology above other modes of thinking and being 
in global politics. On the contrary, understanding how secularism has in fact contributed to a 
misreading of religion is key to engaging religion at not just the regulative level but also the 
constitutive level within International Relations theory. As Fahy and Haynes note “[s]ecularization 
theory in social science (or the broader category of modernization theory in political science) is 
often presented as the main culprit” (Fahy & Haynes, 2018). This article cautions against the 
mythologies of secularism determining the legitimacy and/or validity of sovereignty on the basis 
of secularity alone. Allocating sovereignty to a secular domain, in which laws seemingly regulate 
the conduct of and between states, is part of a longstanding trend to present modernity as the 
progressive current of international relations theory. 
This progressive association of liberalism as a forward-looking, forward thinking theory of 
international politics can be demonstrated in G John Ikenberry’s current concern about the politics 
of backlash in global politics. As Ikenberry argues “[i]n the nineteenth century, liberal 
internationalism was seen in the movements towards free trade, international law, collective 
security and the functional organization of the western capitalist system” (Ikenberry, 2018, p. 9). 
Furthermore, Ikenberry claims that liberal internationalism is “a way of thinking about and 
responding to modernity—its opportunities and its dangers” (Ikenberry, 2018, p. 9). In his 
discussion of the anti-liberal backlash there is no mention of religion or contemporary movements 
driven to embrace a particular cause on the basis of religion or nationalism itself. In Ikenberry’s 
liberal international creed, moves towards an international order are progressive, secular, and 
inherent legacies of our post-Enlightenment world. Challenges to this order are backward and must 
be countered with an even more open, even more institutionalised ‘rules-based order’ which is 
‘progressively orientated’ (Ikenberry, 2018, p. 12). The strange absence of religion, of faith, and/or 
of nationalism from this world looks more akin to the ‘family’ snapshots described by Ken Booth: 
“just as family snaps help us tell different (and sunnier) family stories from the daily routines of 
life, so international relations snapshots change, exclude and massage reality” (Booth, 1995, p. 
104). The question needs to be asked, would those subject to the violence of our territorialised 
borders or suffering at the hands of a corrupt government recognise this rules-based order? Self-
meanings might be important for academic debate, but in terms of making sense of the broader 
practices within international society we need to be cognisant of the fact that methodological 
pluralism is not a whim but actually a function of the plural worlds in which we live. Secularism 
might be regarded as the Emperor’s New Clothes of world politics; so enmeshed in a desire to 
establish a progressive narrative of global order that it overlooks how constitutive of global order 
religion and theology actually are. 
This does not mean that Carl Schmitt’s account of sovereignty should necessarily be deployed 
for establishing an account of International Political Theology within global politics. But there 
is value in reflecting upon how religion has been encoded with the professional space of 
International Relations at the same time as operating as a discourse of threat within the 
practices of contemporary security politics. As noted by Kubálková, “religions have either 
been treated as one amongst many epistemic communities, or as non-government or 
transnational organisations” (Kubálková, 2000). Taking religion more seriously, as a 
constitutive element of political communities, would involve unpacking the practices, 
processes and concepts which sustain global order. As Duncan Bell has identified in relation 
to conceptions of Empire in Victorian thought, the failure to examine the theoretical and 
methodological conditions which enable empire has been a primary weakness of scholarship 
within International Relations. The Victorian imperial imagination, Bell suggests, was 
sustained through political claims about religion, civilization and theories of progress (Bell, 
2006, p. 287). 
Echoing this claim, Scott Thomas has also sought to engage theology for extending the reach 
of critical theory within global politics. Scott’s alignment of theology with critical theory, 
involving a rejection of positivist working methodologies, demands a reassessment of the 
placement of religion within the discipline of International Relations. Even the ‘religious turn’ 
(with 9/11 symbolically rendered as the pathologizing moment for religion in global politics) 
has reduced religion to something which is ‘to be studied’ but seldom understood on its own 
terms. Thomas calls for a rethinking of the placement of religion in global politics, especially 
as the worlds in which global inequalities are most pronounced (including structural and 
physical violence) are communities with religious commitments: “All life is not only lived 
within theories; far more importantly is the fact that for most of the people in the world all life 
is lived within theologies and spiritualities” (Thomas, 2010, p. 509). 
It should be noted that the injunction to take religion seriously can operate at many levels; 
from a reflexive engagement with the historical evolution of both political and religious ideas 
within international political thought (see Bell and Rengger) or as a call for reflection on the 
role of prayer and religious practices within global politics (see Thomas and Kubálková). 
Expressing sovereignty as an expression of the political theology, conditioned by the dictates 
of the exception, challenges both the rationalized accounts of legal sovereignty (juristic 
sovereignty) and popularized accounts of sovereignty (popular sovereignty) which are 
typically presented as definitive accounts of ‘modern’ sovereignty. 
Mirroring Schmitt’s narrative of the evolution of sovereignty, Morgenthau has noted that 
“[t]he modern conception of sovereignty was first formulated in the latter part of the sixteenth 
century with reference to the new phenomenon of the territorial state” (Morgenthau, 1960, p. 
312). Whilst sovereignty may operate as a ‘political fact’ for thinkers such as Morgenthau, it 
is important to recognise how the seemingly secularity of contemporary scholarship in 
International Relations can be understood through the historical lens of prior forms of 
theocracy and theodicy. The modernity of international legal order, its symbolic gesture 
towards progressivity and impartiality, must be categorically rejected as an epistemological 
basis for devising systematic theory within International Relations. As argued by Paipais  
(2016) “it is crucial to revisit the fragmented theological tropes behind contemporary 
anthropologies and concomitant philosophies of history precisely because these tropes are not 
readily legible as theological anymore”. Theorists of International Relations have looked to 
UFO’s to make intelligible the operating logics of insecurity in world politics. For many, the 
claim that “sovereignty is the province of humans alone” is largely an uncontroversial one 
(Wendt & Duvall, 2008, p. 607). What follows from this understanding of sovereignty is 
unashamedly anthropomorphic in its hierarchies of value: “Animals and Nature are assumed 
to lack the cognitive capacity and/or subjectivity to be sovereign; and while God might have 
ultimate sovereignty, even most religious fundamentalists grant that it is not exercised directly 
in the temporal world” (Wendt & Duvall, 2008, p. 607). Yet in examining the theopolitics of 
sovereignty, whether as an intended or unintended expression of decisionist capacity in global 
politics, it is important to see how theologies of order still emerge through theopolitics. 
Morgenthau’s observation that scholars of International Relations are often unaware that “they 
meet under an empty sky from which the gods have departed” should be explored more 
philosophically as a political claim about the origins of sovereignty. In cautioning against the 
‘religion as a variable’ approach to religion in global politics, the intention is to underscore 
the importance of reflexive engagement with disciplinary knowledges that constitute the 
normative and analytical agenda of scholarship in global politics. Theology (and theopolitics) 
is one such disciplinary knowledge and reducing it down to a variable ‘to be studied’ is not 
sufficient for the task of thinking ethically and reflexively about how secular frameworks are 
themselves expressions of religious orders. We should remind ourselves of how everyday 
concepts in global politics are endowed with the reverence of the sacred in International 
Relations. Nationalism can be understood as a ‘secular’ religion; or as Morgenthau observed 
in relation to nationalist universalism: “It [nationalism] is a secular religion, universal in its 
interpretation of the nature and destiny of man and in its promise of salvation for all mankind” 
(Morgenthau, 1960, p. 338). 
Theology (and theopolitics) needs to be understood as a disciplinary knowledge within the 
broad field of International Relations. A sensitive analysis of the origins of sovereignty thereby 
conditions the types of questions we ask about the constitution of world politics more widely. 
In an age of populism, where the complexity of religious orders are reduced down to binary 
categories of good versus evil, we do not need to accept the secular mythology of IR as value-
neutral, unencumbered from the norms and values which have descended from a long tradition 
of European statehood and subsequently ‘exported’ to across the world. We do, however, need 
to refuse the ‘religion as a variable’ approach to global politics by encouraging reflexive forms 
of scholarship which allow us to rethink the conceptual frameworks (including theological) 
that condition our thinking on identity and difference within world politics. Wouldn’t it be 
ironic if the secular worlds we have constructed, to politically demarcate our friends from our 
enemies, came to be nothing more than the received doctrine of European statecraft and all its 
theological (and violent) preoccupations? 
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